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“SUCCESS BY ASSOCIATION”:  
THE IMPACT OF VC FIRM REPUTATION TREND ON IPO VALUATIONS   
 
  
ABSTRACT  
Organizational theory recognizes reputation as a central element to understanding the firm. 
Examining investor valuations of 1,676 IPOs in the U.S. from 1990 to 2011, we find that 
reputation transfer through an association of an IPO firm with a venture capital (VC) firm 
represents a resource whose value can increase/decrease over time depending on investors’ 
valuations of prior IPOs funded by a VC firm. We conclude that the impact of reputation transfer 
through association is not unidirectional, but instead is to be viewed in the context of prior 
reputational development of organizations the focal firm is associated with.  Further, we find that 
three “transfer enhancers” can improve the impact of VC reputation transfer on IPO valuations 
including the VC’s past intensity, the diversity of IPO experiences, and the number of prior 
syndicated IPOs involving the VC firm as a lead investor.   
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“SUCCESS BY ASSOCIATION”:  
THE IMPACT OF VC FIRM REPUTATION TREND ON IPO VALUATIONS   
“Guy Hands conceded in a London court that his reputation was severely 
tarnished by the disastrous £4.2bn debt-fueled takeover of EMI and admitted that 
his legal battle against the US bank was more likely to be beneficial in repairing the 
€200m damage to his finances than in restoring his standing in the City… In court, 
Citi’s lawyer Mark Howard had said Hands had been described as an investor with 
“magic sauce”, with a reputation for cutting costs and securitizing – borrowing 
against income streams generated by the business… The EMI deal, clinched just as 
the credit crunch took the wind out of the decade’s debt-fueled acquisitions spree, 
had been a rare blemish on the career of a 56-year-old.” The Guardian, June 10, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/10/profile-guy-hands-reputation-
blemished-by-emi-deal (accessed October 4, 2018) 
Organizational theorists argue that in a high uncertainty environment, such as stock 
market valuations, external audiences may rely less on their rational judgment in deciding 
whether to interact with the firm, but rather more on their perceptions of the firm’s value 
(Acharya and Pollock, 2013; Bell, Filatotchev and Aguilera, 2014). Such an argument is aligned 
with the evidence on external linkages as a key driver of the perceptions of a firm in such 
settings (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008).  Consistent with this view, 
Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman and Sloan (1976) argue that firms may benefit when 
a positive evaluation is transferred from one organization to another. From this perspective, 
therefore, external investors’ perceptions of an IPO firm’s value may  depend on the reputation 
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of parties linked to the IPO firm including venture capital (VC) firms (Ertug, Yogev, Lee, and 
Hedström, 2016; Hochberg, Lindsey, and Westerfield, 2015).  
Scholars do not yet fully understand the socio-economic mechanisms that form the basis 
for such reputation transfer, whether transfer came from success or failure. However, as the 
above quote relating to private equity investor Guy Hands’ concern for his reputation illustrates, 
in practice reputation can be severely damaged quickly. This damage in turn can lead to 
significant long-lasting financial consequences as future investment opportunities are impacted. 
While in practice there is evidence of concern for reputation and its transfer between different 
actors in economic exchanges, scholars are yet to build such an understanding of reputation from 
a socio-economic perspective (Lange, Lee, and Dai 2011; Love and Kraatz, 2009).  
Fombrun (1996: 72) defines business reputation as “a perceptual representation of a 
company's past actions and future prospects that describes the firm's overall appeal to all of its 
key constituents when compared with other leading rivals.” Reputation is thus “a perception that 
organizations are positively distinctive within their peer group” (King and Whetten, 2008: 192). 
IPO firms offer a setting to examine reputation since they typically have a very limited 
performance track record. As such, to obtain a positive appeal among external constituencies, 
including stock market investors, IPO firms typically employ their linkages to reputable VC 
firms. The role of reputation can be seen in the research examining VC firm backing of a 
particular IPO; highly reputable VC firms positively affect investors’ perceptions of the IPO, and 
subsequently, its valuation (Lee, Pollock, and Jin, 2011; Pollock, Lee, Jin and Lashley, 2015).  
Lange, et al. (2011: 180) point out, however, that the main problem in prior studies is that 
“…scholars have proposed and tested unidirectional rather than bidirectional causal relationships 
involving organizational reputation. It seems unlikely that the direction between reputation and 
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such variables as firm performance is in fact unidirectional.” More specifically, the reputation of 
the VC firm itself may vary over time, either increasing or decreasing, depending on the stock 
market performance of their previous IPOs (Gomulya et al. 2018).1  In turn, such variations in 
reputation could impact the VC firms’ ability to aid the focal IPO firm’s valuation by external 
investors (Petkova, Wadhwa, Xin and Jain, 2014). 
Theoretically, reputation reflects the ability of a firm to repeatedly succeed in its stated 
intention over a sequence of independent events (Herbig et al., 1994). Thus, reputation is a 
historical notion generated from past results, and which makes the intention of the firm credible 
at a specific moment in time (Herbig and Milewicz, 1995). As such, if the reputation of a VC 
firm can accumulate or deteriorate depending on the success of past IPOs of their portfolio firms, 
then the capacity of that VC firm to enhance investor perceptions of its current investee also has 
the potential to change, and even become negative. This insight has the ability to expand 
significantly the topic of reputation transfer in organizational theory research by moving the 
view of reputation beyond a static, unidirectional and generic concept, into a value-based 
concept using the investor valuations of recent IPOs involving the focal VC firm.  Here we 
address this theoretical issue by bringing a time-variant dimension to the process of “success by 
association” to examine our first (main effect) research question: How does the VC firms’ 
reputation accumulated over time through prior IPOs affect valuations of IPO firms they 
currently bring to the stock market?   
Further, researchers, with rare exceptions (e.g., Gomulya et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2011; 
Rindova, Williamson, Petkova and Sever, 2005), have considered reputation through external 
linkages as a unidimensional factor largely associated with past performance of the reputable 
connecting party. However, various components of reputational assets accumulate through 
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different processes, broadening the basis on which stakeholders perceive reputation beyond one 
specific attribute such as past performance track record (Rindova et al., 2005). Developing these 
arguments further, Lange et al. (2011) emphasize that the complexities of organizational 
reputation point to the need for further research using a multidimensional conceptualization of 
reputation and exploring the interactions among the dimensions. VC firm-level contextual factors 
provide additional, indirect information to outside investors about the VC firm’s reputation, and 
should not be considered as orthogonal to the performance-centered reputation metrics, since 
they may perform a role of reputation transfer “enhancers” (Lange et al., 2011: 177). Building on 
prior studies that have differentiated between various dimensions of reputation (Deephouse and 
Carter, 2005; Gomulya et al., 2018; Lange et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 2005), we argue that VC 
firms backing a focal IPO have three time-dependent characteristics that serve as reputation 
transfer enhancers further contributing to the focal IPO firm’s value. These VC firm 
characteristics include the intensity of the VC’s previous IPO deal experience, diversity of the 
VC’s IPO firm age experience, with age being used as a proxy for ex-ante uncertainty of a 
portfolio firm, and the VC’s lead syndicate experience. We argue that these transfer enhancers 
may be particularly salient in affecting the overall VC firm reputation impact on investor 
perceptions of an IPO firm. Therefore, we also ask our second (contingency) research question: 
How do reputation transfer enhancers affect the relationship between the IPO firm’s valuation 
and the accumulated reputation of the VC firm that is backing this focal IPO?      
Answering these two research questions, we make a number of contributions to the 
literature.  Theoretically, we help develop a deeper understanding of the complex relationship 
between reputation transfer and recipient performance as a core concern in organizational theory 
and strategic management research.  Specifically, we extend theory by highlighting that 
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investors’ perceptions of the IPO firm’s value are not only related to the assessment of a firm’s 
assets, technology and past performance but are affected by the time-dependent reputation of 
third parties the firm is associated with and, in turn, contributes to. This consideration of the 
dynamic, mutually interdependent relationship between “senders” and “recipients” in the context 
of reputation transfer represents a novel contribution to previous studies.  
We also contribute by adding to emerging approaches that recognize the bi-directional 
nature of changes to VC reputation (Gomulya et al., 2018) rather than it being a linear, 
unidirectional process (Krishnan et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2011). Specifically, prior work 
associates reputation of a particular VC firm with a large number of companies taken public, a 
high total dollar amount of funds under management, or a large number of start-ups invested in 
over a specific period. We build on this approach by arguing and showing empirically that 
investors focus on reputation based on value creation. Investors are, after all, interested in the 
returns they can generate. High levels of new investment activity in a particular year may not 
convert into high returns. Further, as we know from studies of portfolio returns (Kaplan and 
Schoar, 2005; Epstein and Schneider, 2008), such value creation takes time to emerge as IPOs 
from a VC investment portfolio are distributed over time and may or may not be successful.  As 
such, a VC builds its reputation dynamically only if these public offerings are associated with an 
increasing trend in terms of IPO firm value. Stated differently, building on the dynamic nature of 
reputation (i.e. the reputation of a VC firm changes with each IPO), we consider that each VC 
firm enters the IPO process with a ‘stock of experience’, comprising its background and past 
IPOs that have accrued up to that point. We therefore extend existing literature by using a value-
based reputation approach using the accumulated reputation of a focal VC firm based on the 
trend of its past IPO values. 
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We further expand theory around reputation and its organizational outcomes by helping 
establish what VC firm characteristics developed over time act as a reputation transfer enhancer. 
This understanding of reputation enhancers represents an important theoretical extension of prior 
studies adopting a unidimensional focus on the organizational outcomes of the linkages (Acharya 
and Pollock, 2013; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007; 
Hochberg at al., 2015). This shift shows that the relationship between third party reputation and 
stock market performance of a focal firm is not universal. Rather, it is contingent on time 
dependent characteristics of the third party itself, in line with research on multiple dimensions of 
reputation (Lange et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 2005).  More specifically, we argue that, in the 
context of IPOs, the three transfer enhancement mechanisms related to (1) the number of 
previous flotation experiences by the VC firm invested in the focal IPO, (2) the age diversity of 
firms backed by the same VC firm in the past, and (3) the number of prior syndicated IPOs 
involving the VC firm as a lead investor play an important role in boosting the effect of the VC 
firm’s reputation on the valuation of a newly listed firm. Our contingency framework suggests 
that the process of inter-organizational transfer of reputation is more complex than previously 
understood. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A fast-growing number of studies emphasize that, with high uncertainty and risks 
associated with stock market transactions, external audiences may have significant difficulties in 
making objective judgments regarding the firm’s behavior and future growth prospects that 
underpin investor perceptions of the firm’s value (Bell et al., 2014; Pollock et al., 2008; Zajac 
and Westphal, 2004). Although IPO firms need to disclose considerable information in their 
issue documents, it is well-established that an IPO is a corporate event associated with a high 
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level of asymmetric information between issuing firm and external investors about its “true” 
value (Ritter and Welch, 2002). In this context, firm reputation becomes a particularly important 
intangible organizational asset (Deephouse, 2000; Lee et al., 2011) since it is valuable in 
reducing the uncertainty stakeholders face in evaluating firms (Rindova et al., 2005). Some 
authors go further, suggesting such benefits may be transferable through inter-organizational 
connections (Lange et al., 2011; Pollock, Chen, Jackson, and Hambrick, 2010; Rindova et al., 
2005). 
An important strand of reputation transfer research suggests that, with high uncertainty 
about whether past information is a reliable guide for future performance in entrepreneurial firms 
coming to market, firms may gain external parties’ recognition by associating with reputable 
social actors in their environment. Cialdini et al. (1976) called this process “basking in reflected 
glory”, and organizational legitimacy theorists call it “legitimacy by association” (Bitektine, 
2011). These studies emphasize benefits that the firm may obtain from the reputation of 
organizations or individuals it is connected with (Acharya and Pollock, 2013; Certo, 2003; 
Hochberg et al., 2015).  Lange et al. (2011) note that since reputation depends on the level of 
familiarity with, or knowledge of, an organization by outsiders, regardless their judgment of the 
firm, the firm’s affiliation with prominent partners can enhance its reputation. 
These arguments are particularly important in the context of IPOs because these firms, 
being in ambiguous circumstances and lacking a performance track record, seek to reduce others’ 
uncertainties by forging exchange relationships with reputable actors (Acharya and Pollock, 
2013). The IPO firm may enhance investor perceptions of its quality and, therefore, its stock 
market valuation by associating with highly reputable third parties.  
Reputation Transfer: Past VC Premium Trend and IPO Firm Valuation 
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Studies adopting an economics view of reputation emphasize “technical efficacy” (Love 
and Kraatz, 2009), and argue that highly reputable VC firms are expected to have superior 
abilities to identify most promising investment opportunities. A significant body of research in 
finance and management has focused on VC firms as an important type of “reputation 
transmitters” (Chahine, Arthurs, Filatotchev and Hoskisson, 2012; Petkova et al., 2014; 
Hochberg et al., 2015). Lee et al. (2011) and Pollock et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive set of 
theoretical arguments why a VC firm’s reputation can positively affect valuations of IPO firms it 
brings to the market.  VC firms strive to preserve their reputation and are more likely to take on 
most promising ventures. This helps reduce investors’ adverse selection problems and, in turn, 
improve IPO valuation. Further, reputable VC firms have superior monitoring capabilities and 
numerous useful connections and knowledge resources that should reduce moral hazard 
problems for investors in their IPO firms. In sum, from an economics perspective, high-
reputation VC firms help certify that the focal IPO firm possesses the attributes that other market 
participants would infer if it had an extensive performance track record, and/or that these VC 
firms will make their own contribution to enhance the IPO firm’s future prospects (Lange et al., 
2011). 
However, prior research grounded in an economic perspective views reputation of the 
focal firm’s connections largely as a static concern, and reputation transfer itself as a 
unidirectional process (Kraatz and Love, 2006), when the current level of reputation of a 
“sender” impacts performance of a “receiver”.  In critiquing this approach, Lange et al. (2011: 
180) suggest that “modeling bidirectional causal relationships involving organizational 
reputation will be consistent with the inherently dynamic nature of organizational reputation.”  
Indeed, reputation is acknowledged as a historical concept based on intertemporal linkages that 
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result from previous actions over a prolonged period of time (Selden, 1978). As a VC firm enters 
a focal IPO process, it holds a “stock of experience” accrued up to that point from prior IPOs that 
is available to outside investors to take into account. Therefore, in the context of reputation 
transfer processes, reputation should be recognized as a dynamic concept whereby VC firm 
reputation impacts valuation of the focal firm they fund, but the valuation of the focal firm also 
impacts VC firm reputation over time. This view is consistent with Pollock, Lee, Jin and Lashley 
(2015) who took into account the variability of VC ‘quality’ experience – either in general and/or 
in relation to IPOs – in their analysis. 
Building on the view that reputation is a dynamic concept, we argue that the effectiveness 
of VC reputation transfer can increase or decrease over time. VC reputation represents a 
cumulative process based on prior successful or unsuccessful IPOs. Outside investors may 
perceive the outcomes of previous IPOs led by a specific VC firm as an indicator of the extent to 
which it is reliable and distinctive from other (less reputable) VC firms. Given that VCs are 
usually involved in a series of IPOs, outside investors will try to infer the quality of the focal VC 
firm from the performance of previous IPOs in which the focal VC was involved, thus focusing 
on prior valuations-based indicators of VC reputation (Ebbers and Wijnberg, 2016). The 
resulting reputation, in turn, affects the price premium investors are willing to pay for each IPO 
firm’s equity, creating a trend in the premium across the series of the VC’s IPOs over time. The 
ability to view reputation transfer to the firm through a socio-economic mechanism that is time-
dependent highlights reputation as an intangible asset, which builds or deteriorates over time; 
this view of reputation challenges the previously established views of reputation transfer as a 
static, unidirectional process.   
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To summarize, we argue that IPO firms will benefit, or be penalized, from their VC firm 
backers’ prior success, or failure, due to reputation transfer. The VC firm’s reputation dynamics 
is reflected in investor perceptions of the current IPO and affects the price premium they are 
willing to pay. This price premium, in turn, feeds back into the VC firm’s reputation trend that is 
considered by investors when judging IPO firms that this VC firm will subsequently bring to the 
market, and this dynamic process of judgment/reputation formation unfolds further as long as the 
VC firm continues to be active in the IPO market.  Thus, in terms of the IPO valuation process, 
one can expect investors to value VC firm-backed IPOs, and pay a higher price premium, 
depending on whether the VC firms involved have proven their success in prior investments. As 
a result, the trend of increasing or decreasing value creation by VC firms in their prior IPOs will 
positively, or negatively, impact the value of the focal IPO firm.  Therefore, our main effect 
hypothesis is: 
H1: The price premium of a VC firm-backed IPO is positively associated with the past 
premium trend of prior IPOs backed by the same VC firm.   
Reputation Transfer Moderators 
Hypothesis 1 argues that the VC firm’s prior success or failure (premium trend over time) 
impacts the valuation of the focal IPO. As noted above, this assumption is consistent with the 
economics perspective on reputation with its emphasis on “technical efficacy” (Love and Kraatz, 
2009). Building on Lange et al. (2011), and Love and Kraatz (2009) who suggest that this 
perspective should be considered in conjunction with other dimensions of reputation, we adopt a 
sociological theory-grounded perspective on reputation and its organization outcomes. This 
perspective suggests that reputation may be a multi-dimensional theoretical construct, that should 
involve, apart from the past performance track record, the perceivers’ broader awareness of the 
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organization irrespective of performance evaluation (Lange et al., 2011). Rindova et al. (2005) 
observe that as the institutional perspective is concerned with the collective awareness and 
recognition that an organization has accumulated in its organizational field, it emphasizes the 
prominence dimension of organizational reputation.  
We extend these arguments and suggest the impact of VC firm reputation transfer is not a 
unidimensional process. Rather, reputation transfer will be contingent on other time-related 
characteristics of the VC firm associated with the VC firm’s broader prior experience with the 
IPO market.  These time-related characteristics will enhance the reputation transfer from VC 
firms to portfolio companies coming to the stock market. Although Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
there is a direct relationship between the VC firm’s reputation associated with its prior IPO 
valuation trend and investors’ perception of its investee IPO, the impact of reputation transfer is 
not uniform across VC firms with the same level of technical efficacy.  Therefore, we argue that 
key VC firm-level, stock market experience-related factors may operate in conjunction with 
prior-valuation-based reputation trend, therefore providing a “boost” or enhancer to the overall 
mechanism of reputation transfer to the IPO firm.   
These arguments are in line with more recent research that suggests that information 
asymmetries may also be a source of investors’ ambiguity (as opposed to uncertainty) about the 
firm that may prompt different responses among investors and more long-term efforts from the 
firm to clarify. Park and Patel (2015), for example, explore ambiguity in terms of information 
clarity in the wording of IPO prospectuses. The authors find that underpricing is lower when IPO 
prospectuses contain clearer information about the firm. Epstein and Schneider (2008) relate 
ambiguity to the quality of information and its impact on asset pricing: news from more reliable 
sources in their theoretical model should lead to more portfolio re-balancing compared to news 
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from less reliable sources. In other words, factors that may contribute to the VC firm’s 
prominence may reduce ambiguity associated with reputation based on past economic 
performance.2 
The experience-related enhancer refers to the increase in value of the reputation transfer 
related to the increased market participation of the firm’s business associate over time 
(Deephouse and Carter, 2005). In terms of the reputational transfer from VC firm to IPO, the 
transfer can be significantly enhanced if stock market investors, in addition to the VC firm’s past 
IPO valuation trend, perceive the level of a VC firm’s prior experience in the IPO market as 
high.  The sociological institutional perspective on reputation suggests a high level of 
participation may contribute to the VC firm’s prominence that “captures the degree to which an 
organization receives large-scale collective recognition in its organizational field” (Rindova et 
al., 2005: 1035).  Lange et al. (2011) refer to this process as being known and suggest this 
dimension of reputation may enhance the impact of reputation based solely on past economic 
performance (e.g., being known for something).  
The existing literature suggests that reputation, or being known, for VCs relates to three 
concerns: 1) intensity of their own experience, 2) the diversity of the VC’s experience, and 3) the 
extent of their experience of interacting with others VCs through syndication (Yang, Narayan 
and Zahra, 2009). Therefore, we focus on these three aspects of VC firm experience and how 
they moderate the relationship stated in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, we examine how these three 
aspects of reputation relate to the IPO market - previous IPO deal experience, IPO age 
experience diversity, and IPO lead syndicate experience.  
We argue that even with similar levels of success in terms of prior IPO valuations, some 
VC firms are more active than others in making investments in firms that ultimately pursue IPOs.  
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Greater experience in participating in more deals allows VC firms to demonstrate more often 
over time their ability to create greater effectiveness, efficiency, and utility in making 
investments. Similarly, the number of IPO exits is one way to assess whether past valuation 
performance of the VC firm is sustained (Cumming, 2007) as IPOs are widely regarded as the 
best exit outcomes for VC firms (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006). Thus, 
increasing participation in IPOs enhances the assurance to potential outside investors of the value 
of the VC firm’s reputation in being able to increase the quality and value of new ventures 
(Proimos and Wright, 2005).  Such increasing participation in IPOs means VC firms can 
integrate compressible and focused routines, providing the basis for capacity development (Yang 
et al., 2009). Investors, therefore, will view VC firms with a higher level of experience over time 
as a greater force in the reputation transfer process.  This greater force of reputation will 
persuade investors to pay more for IPOs associated with experienced VC firms at a given trend 
of success with prior IPOs. As a result, we expect the relationship between the premium trend of 
past IPOs of the VC firm and the price premium of the current focal IPO suggested in 
Hypothesis 1 to be positively moderated by the number of prior IPO experiences of the VC firm, 
labeled here as “experience intensity”.   Therefore: 
H2: The relationship between the price premium of a VC firm- backed IPO and the past 
premium trend of prior IPOs backed by the same VC firm is positively moderated by 
experience intensity of that VC firm. 
Reputation may also be enhanced by the diversity of experience, defined as “the extent to 
which experience is accumulated through the solution of a diverse range of problems associated 
with subjects of interest” (Yang et al., 2009: 265). VC firms could gain that knowledge when 
exposed to different situations and sets of conditions (Yang et al., 2009). This suggests that the 
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greater the variety of experiences in managing uncertainties faced by a VC firms, the greater the 
ability of the VC firms to make appropriate decisions.  
In preparing their portfolio companies to go public, VC firms face various sources of 
valuation uncertainties. This requires VC firms to develop the required skills and capabilities to 
solve a wide range of problems associated with their portfolio companies. One source of 
uncertainty used in IPO valuation is portfolio firm age at IPO, i.e. how established it is 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Older firms are easier to value, since more of their value is 
represented by capitalized earnings than by expectations about future growth rates, which can 
vary substantially from firm to firm. Kim and Ritter (1999) show that absolute prediction error in 
the valuation of firms younger than ten years old at the time of their public offerings is higher 
than that observed for older firms. Beatty and Zajac (1994) use firm age at IPO as a proxy for its 
experience or sophistication. Given the high level of information asymmetry in the valuation of 
new firms, IPO investors may use firm age as secondary information to sort firms (Sanders and 
Boivie, 2004; Park and Patel, 2015; Lungeanu and Zajac, 2016). Thus, age of the IPO firms 
taken to market is a key element of diversity of the focal VC firm’s experience. 
Regardless of the age of the portfolio company at the time of VC investment, VC firms 
screen, select and support with the aim to achieve a successful exit. While some VC firms may 
grandstand and take their portfolio companies at an early stage, other VC firms may take public 
older portfolio companies, thus reducing the uncertainty faced by outside investors (Gompers, 
1996). Some VC firms may also develop an expertise in taking firms public at different ages. 
This diversity of experience can signal to potential investors that the VC firm has the ability to 
pick firms across a broader range of different business opportunities and succeed in taking them 
public at different stages of development. Following Rindova et al. (2005), a wider experience 
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diversity should also contribute to the VC firm’s prominence which should act as an enhancer 
regarding the impact of reputation based on past economic performance (e.g., being known for 
something, Lange et al., 2011). Therefore, the VC firm’s prior experience diversity in dealing 
with firms of different ages should enhance the overall impact of the reputational trend on the 
IPO’s valuation identified in Hypothesis 1. 
The more the VC firm is known for having pursued opportunities in businesses at 
different ages, the more likely it will build an expectation among outside investors that it will 
accurately judge the value of and effectively monitor a potential portfolio company (Hayward, 
2002).  Investing in diverse IPO age levels can create an additional resource that can be 
transferred to a focal IPO firm associated with the VC firm, and this in turn is reflected in the 
value placed on the IPO firm by investors. Thus, we expect the relationship between the past 
premium trend of IPOs with which the VC firm was associated and the price premium of the 
current IPO found in Hypothesis 1 to be positively moderated by the range of the VC firm’s 
experiences in taking them public at different ages, labeled here as “experience diversity.” 
Therefore: 
H3: The relationship between the price premium of VC firm-backed IPO and the past 
premium trend of prior IPOs backed by the same VC firm is positively moderated by 
experience diversity of that VC firm. 
While IPO valuation depends on its association with reputable third parties, the VC firm 
also has relational capital that depends on the VC firm’s recognition by its peers.  Such 
recognition by peers may enhance the overall impact of VC firm reputation on investor 
perceptions of the focal IPO. One key form of relational capital for the VC comes through their 
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activity in syndications (Chahine et al., 2012), that is when a group of VC firms come together to 
fund a new venture rather than a single VC firm taking on all of the risk (Pollock et al., 2015). 
Participation in syndicated deals encourages VC firms to share complementary 
knowledge and learn to share financial risks among syndicate partners (Dimov and De Clerq, 
2006). Syndication represents a way to work with others and obtain pooled financial and 
knowledge-based resources that could not be reached otherwise (Hochberg et al., 2015). 
Syndication increases the VC firms’ social network (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001), creating greater 
access to knowledge and resources that aid the firm in which they invest (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, 
and Lu, 2007). VC firms with greater syndication experience, especially as a lead investor, 
would likely have access to both complementary management skills (Brander, Amit, and 
Antweiler, 2002) and future deals (Hochberg et al., 2007). As a result, scholars argue that well-
networked VC firms perform better since they can provide better value added services to 
portfolio companies (Hochberg et al., 2007). Some VC syndicate partners may act as so-called 
“dumb money”, who share the financial risk, but bring little if any knowledge to help the 
business to grow towards a successful exit. If that were the case, the reputation of VC firms 
would not be enhanced through involvement in more deals. However, such dumb money would 
not lead a syndication.    
Prior research suggests that syndicate leads typically have greater interaction with 
portfolio companies than do other syndicate partners. The syndicate leads direct exit decisions 
through drag-along clauses and other non-contractual mechanisms that implement such decisions 
by syndicates (Wright and Lockett, 2003). Such decisions on exit are complex, as the VC must 
consider not only the development of the portfolio company, but also changing stock and asset 
market conditions. Greater experiences of adding value to portfolio companies and coordinating 
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syndicates to exit enables syndicate leads to develop expertise and a reputation of being able to 
bring portfolio companies to a successful IPO as outlined in Hypothesis 1. While the exit from 
syndicates can undermine a VC firm’s reputation (Zhelyazkov and Gulati, 2016), experiences of 
leading a syndicate to a successful exit can be expected to enhance value.  
This belief in the syndication lead enhancing value is further encouraged by the evidence 
that being a lead investor increases the VC firm’s prominence and reputation within the VC 
community (Podolny, 1993). The result is a generalized favorability view of the IPO firm where 
it is perceived as “good, attractive, and appropriate” (Lange et al., 2011: 155).  Lange and 
colleagues argue that generalized favorability may enhance the effects of being known for 
something dimension of reputation which, in our context, is approximated by the past valuation 
trend. It follows that through prior leadership roles in syndicated co-investments by its VC 
backers, the focal IPO associates itself with a wider pool of firms that have obtained the stock 
market listing in the past increasing therefore its value perception vis-à-vis stock market 
investors. Thus, we expect the relationship between the past premium trend of previous IPOs and 
the price premium of the current IPO found in Hypothesis 1 is positively moderated by the lead 
syndicate experience of the VC firm. Therefore: 
H4: The relationship between the price premium of a VC firm-backed IPO and the past 
premium trend of prior IPOs backed by the same VC firm is positively moderated by lead 
syndicate experience of that VC firm. 
DATA AND METHOD 
We adopted a multi-stage data collection procedure, first collecting the entire list of 2,567 
VC firm-backed IPOs in the U.S. listed in the Thomson One Banker and SDC Platinum database 
from 1990 to 2011. We focused on all VC firms with previous IPO experience (i.e., prior IPO 
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premium). This approach resulted in 1,174 distinct VC firms involved in 1,676 IPOs with a total 
number of 7,331 individual VC firm-IPO firm observations for which we have complete 
information on firm characteristics and IPO premium.  
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable, IPO Premium, is the price premium paid for a firm at IPO, 
defined as the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the book value per share over 
the offer price (Nelson 2003; Rasheed, Datta, and Chinta, 1997). Offer price represents the price 
that investors have expressed their willingness to pay during the pre-IPO roadshows (Welbourne 
and Andrews, 1996). By comparing offer price to book value, the premium indicates what 
fraction of the offer price represents the premium over book value per share. It includes the 
effects of fundamental factors, such as intangible assets and competitive advantages of the firm 
that are not included in the accounting value of the assets (Nelson 2003).  Bell et al. (2014) and 
Filatotchev, Chahine, and Bruton (2018) argue that price premium is a reliable proxy for investor 
perceptions of a firm in the highly uncertain context of stock market listings.3  
Independent variables 
Past VC Premium Trend is the trend of the price premium for all previous IPOs in which 
the same VC firm participated since 1990 and prior to the focal IPO’s date. This trend is 
constructed as an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5. Specifically, the Past VC Premium Trend 
variable is equal to 1 if the premium drops continuously from initial IPO to focal IPO; 2 if the 
premium trend varies over time with a decrease in premium on average; 3 if the premium trend 
varies over time with an average change in premium equal to zero; 4 if the premium trend varies 
over time with an increase in premium on average, and 5 if the premium trend varies over time 
and has a  continuous increase in the premium from the VC firm’s first IPO deal in our dataset to 
21 
 
the focal IPO deal. Thus, the premium trend over time examines both the increasing and 
decreasing valuation trends that can develop in a VC firm’s investment activity. 
VC Experience Intensity is the number of previous IPOs in which a particular VC firm 
was involved since 1990 (see Yang, et al. 2009). As some VC firms are more experienced than 
others VC firms in our sample, our empirical tests use the logarithm of the number of previous 
IPOs to avoid skewness effects.  
VC Experience Diversity is the extent to which a VC firm participated in issuing firms 
going public at different ages. We classified IPO firms in 10 different age brackets of 6 years 
each starting from a one-year old IPO firm to 55 years old and above (1 to 6 years, 7 to 12, 13 to 
18,…, 48 to 54, and then 55 years old and above). We argue that different age brackets reflect 
different levels of ex ante uncertainty. We then counted the number of age classes in which a VC 
firm participated in prior to the IPO date.  
VC Lead Syndicate Experience is the intensity of prior lead syndication activities of the 
VC firm measured as the percentage of syndicated IPOs to total IPOs the VC firm has been 
involved in as a lead VC firm before the date of the focal IPO. To calculate VC Lead Syndicate 
Experience, we first use a dummy variable equal to 1 for any VC syndicated IPO in which the 
VC firm has participated as a lead VC, and zero otherwise. We then calculate the percentage of 
syndicated IPOs out of the total IPOs in which the VC firm was involved as a lead VC. 
Finally, as the three measures of the VC’s prior IPO experience may not be orthogonal, 
we computed a VC Overall Experience variable as follows. First, we divided each of our three 
defined reputation transfer enhancers in quintiles ranging from 1 to 5. We then calculated the 
average of the three calculated quintiles. This represents an indicator ranging from 1 (lowest 
experience) to 5 (highest experience). 
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To test Hypotheses 2 to 4, we mean-centered our variables of interest and constructed our 
interaction terms (Aiken and West, 1991). This reduces multicollinearity without altering the 
structure of the relationships between variables. This also allows direct interpretation of 
coefficients in both baseline and interaction equations (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990; Hunter 
and Thatcher, 2007). Our tests show that the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are lower than 
2.59, which rejects potential multi-collinearity problems. 
We calculated all VC firm-related variables at the VC firm level. For example, if several 
VC firms are involved in a syndicated investment in the focal IPO, a VC firm-IPO pair would 
have the same IPO premium, but the VC firms would have different experience, diversity of 
experiences, and pre-lead syndicate experiences. In robustness tests, we also averaged VC firm-
related variables at the IPO firm level, and the results remain consistent (see below). 
Control variables 
We employ several variables to control for both VC firm and focal IPO firm 
characteristics that could affect the results. Given that lead VC firms may play a more influential 
role in determining the premium at IPO, we add a Lead VC dummy, equal to 1 if the VC firm is 
the lead the syndication for the focal IPO, and zero otherwise. In line with prior research, we 
control for VC reputation using two different variables. First, we use the logarithm of VC age 
(Lee and Wahal, 2004). This VC reputation measure controls for unobserved factors such as the 
quality or skill of the VC firm. It allows us to show the marginal impact of our trend variable 
after controlling for VC age, used as a proxy VC reputation. More recently, Lee, Pollock, and Jin 
(LPJ, 2011) propose a VC reputation index that largely measures the standing of an individual 
VC firm within the overall VC investment sector. The LPJ VC reputation index is a multi-item, 
time varying index of formative indicators of VC firm reputation. It is calculated annually for the 
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period 1990-2010, and covers from approximately 500 to 1300 venture capital firms, depending 
on the year. The assessment criteria included in the index are related to the dollar amount and 
number of investment funds under management, the dollar amount invested in start-ups and their 
number, and the number of firms taken public. Therefore, we used the LPJ VC reputation index 
as a second proxy for VC reputation to test our main hypotheses. 
We control for the IPO success ratio of VC firms, which measures the ability of the VC 
firm in converting its portfolio companies into IPOs. The VC IPO success ratio is equal to the 
total number of companies taken public by a VC firm over the total number of its portfolio 
companies in the current year (Chang, 2004; Pollock et al., 2015). Prior literature suggests that 
different types of VC firms have different investment strategies, which affect the value and 
success of portfolio companies (Tykvova and Walz, 2007). We thus control for whether the VC 
firm is Independent VC, Finance VC-affiliated, Corporate VC-affiliated, or Other VC firm (e.g. 
pension funds, endowments, and government VC programs) using dummy variables, 1 if the VC 
firm belongs to a certain type and zero if it does not. The size of the VC syndicate is likely to 
increase IPO premium (Tian, 2012), and we control for it using VC Syndicate, which is equal to 
the total number of VC firms involved in a specific IPO.  
For IPO firm characteristics, we control for Price Revision, which is equal to the 
difference between the offer price and mid-point of the initial price range. Price revision is the 
product of direct negotiation between the underwriter, associated parties, and the IPO firm. 
Further, we control for the liability of newness of the IPO firm using firm size calculated based 
on the logarithm of pre-IPO total assets, Log Asset, and IPO firm age calculated based on the 
logarithm of years since its incorporation, Log IPO Age (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). A Hi-tech 
dummy is also employed to control for the firm’s technology orientation since it may positively 
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affect IPO premium (Filatotchev et al., 2018),4 equal to one 1 if the IPO firm is a high-
technology firm, and zero otherwise. A firm’s leverage, debt over the book value of equity prior 
to the IPO date (Bruton et al., 2010), may provide a monitoring role and increase IPO premium. 
Therefore, we employ a Leverage control. We also control for IPO firm profitability using a Loss 
dummy variable, 1 if the IPO firm had operating losses during the last year prior to IPO date, 
zero otherwise (Filatotchev et al., 2018). As the exit of initial owners at the time of IPO may be 
considered a bad signal, we add Participation ratio, measured as the percentage of secondary 
shares sold by existing shareholders out of the total number of shares offered at IPO, also as a 
control.  
We control for Underwriter Reputation using the ranking in Loughran and Ritter (2004), 
which ranges from zero (least) to nine (most reputable underwriter). We expect reputable 
underwriters to certify the quality of IPO firms, and increase IPO premium. We control for 
whether the IPO is on the NASDAQ using a dummy in order to account for the different 
valuation levels than in NYSE and AMEX (Lowry, Officer, and Schwert, 2010). The Market 
Return variable controls for the effect of market conditions on pricing. This effect is equal to the 
buy-and-hold return of the Value Weighted CRSP index over a three-month period prior to the 
IPO date. The IPO premium is expected to increase in “hot” periods of the market, therefore, we 
employ a control Heat degree, equal to the percentage of IPOs firms with an offer price higher 
than the mid-point of the initial price range during the last month prior to IPO date (Ibbotson, 
Sindelar, and Ritter, 1994). We further control for differences among VC firms using VC 
dummies, and control for the effect of changes in regulatory environment by including year 
dummies, as well as the effect of the difference in pricing models across industries using the 
two-digit SIC codes as industry dummies. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and indicates an average IPO premium of 73%. 
It also shows that the average past premium trend for VC firms is equal to 3.3, which is slightly 
higher than 3, the value at which the average change in past premiums equals zero. A higher than 
3 past VC premium trend suggests that VC premium increases over time. Although not shown in 
Table 1, 504 VC firm-level observations are ranked 1; 2,218 VC firm-level observations are 2; 3 
VC firm-level observations are ranked 3; 3,684 VC firm-level observations are ranked 4; and 
922 VC firm-level observations are ranked 5. These classifications mean that VC firms exhibit a 
positive past premium trend in 62.8% of the VC firm-level observations of IPO premium. In 
addition, VC firms have on average participated in 16 previous IPO, they were involved in more 
than two different IPO age classes and acted as lead VC in 16% of their former IPO deals. The 
Pearson correlation coefficients show a positive association between current IPO premium and 
VC firm’s past premium trend and experience.  
-  Insert Table 1 About Here  - 
Model estimation technique 
To test our hypotheses using the variables described above, we examine VC-backed 
IPOs. However, all VC-backed firms do not necessarily reach IPO.  Non-IPO firms make up a 
considerable portion of a given VC’s portfolio, which might lead to a sample selection bias. To 
avoid such bias, we use a two-stage Heckman (1979) model. In the first-stage regression, we 
estimate the likelihood of going public, i.e. probability of an IPO, using all VC deals in the US 
markets. This allows us to calculate an adjustment term (the inverse mills, Lambda), which 
corrects for the sample selection bias. We then incorporate Lambda in our second-stage testable 
regressions for IPO valuation.5  
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We compiled the extra data and variables for our first-stage regression consistent with 
prior research (i.e., Pagano and Roell, 1998; Chemmanur, He and Nandy, 2010). Specifically, we 
collected data available in VentureXpert on portfolio companies and VC firms’ characteristics 
and we added data on economic and market conditions from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and CRSP databases. In terms of portfolio companies’ characteristics, we expect the 
probability of going public to be positively related to firm size measured by the logarithm of the 
book value of equity of portfolio companies, Log Book Value of Portfolio Company Equity, and  
the logarithm of firm age at the last investment round, Log Portfolio Company Age at Last 
Round. We expect larger and older portfolio companies to be more mature and ready to go 
public. In terms of VC characteristics, we controlled for the average experience of VC syndicate 
members at the last financing round using the logarithm of their average age, Log Average VC 
Syndicate Age.  We expect experienced VC syndicates to better prepare their portfolio companies 
for IPO exits. We also controlled for stage of financing: Seed Stage dummy, Early Stage dummy, 
Expansion Stage dummy, Late Stage dummy, and Balanced Stage dummy; and we expect firms at 
late financing stage to be more ready for an IPO. Further, we controlled for market conditions 
using the logarithm of the number of previous IPOs in the same state, Log Number of Previous 
IPOs, and the equally weighted CRSP one-year market return, Market Return, over the last year 
prior to the last investment round. We also added Heat Degree during the last month prior to the 
last financing round to control for market momentum (Ibbotson et al., 1994). We also controlled 
for the growth rate of the GDP per capital, GDP per Capita Growth, as a proxy for the overall 
economic situation in the U.S., and we expect market and economic conditions to increase the 
probability of going public. Finally, our empirical test controls for state dummies, Industry 
dummies and year dummies.  
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Table 2 includes Model (1) which presents the logit regression of the probability of going 
public using the entire population of 26,172 VC-backed portfolio companies from 1987 to 2011, 
for which we were able to retrieve data from VentureXpert. We start three years prior to our 
studied sample to allow for IPOs following the last investment rounds. As predicted, the 
probability of going public is positively related to portfolio companies’ size, age, and market 
return (at the p < 0.01 or a more significant level), and to a lesser extent to the age of VC 
syndicate (p < 0.05), the number of previous IPOs (p < 0.10), and heat degree in the IPO market 
(p < 0.10). Also, firms are less likely to go public in their seed, early, or expansion financing 
stages (p < 0.001), and are more likely to do so when they are at their late financing stage (p < 
0.001).  
- Insert Table 2 About Here  - 
RESULTS 
Table 3 presents our multivariate regressions that test the four hypotheses using OLS 
regressions after controlling for both measures of VC reputation.6 Specifically, Panel A uses Log 
VC Age as a measure for VC reputation within the full sample of 7,331 VC firm-level 
observations (Lee and Wahal, 2004). Panel B repeats our tests using the LPJ (2011) VC 
reputation index within the sub-sample of 3,737 VC firm-level observations with available data 
on VC reputation.  
- Insert Table 3 About Here – 
Model (2a)-Panel A presents the OLS regression of the IPO Premium on the Past VC 
Premium Trend using the valuations of past IPOs backed by the same VC firm since 1990. It 
examines the linear association between the current IPO valuation and the trend of previous 
premiums and shows a positive and highly significant estimated coefficient of the Past VC 
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Premium Trend, with a t-value of 31.91. The 95% confidence interval for the estimate of the 
Past VC Premium Trend determined by the likelihood ratio and the 5% critical value from the 
X2 distribution is (0.11, 0.13), which is a narrow interval. This confirms the positive and 
significant relationship between the IPO Premium variable and the Past VC Premium Trend, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 1. The results indicate that a one rank increase in the Past VC Premium 
Trend increases the IPO premium by 12%. For an average market capitalization of IPOs in our 
sample of $393.21 million, calculated at the offer price, this represents an average increase of 
$46.48 million in the market capitalization. This finding indicates the high economic significance 
of the process of reputation transfer that we investigate.    
Models (2b) through (2d) present our interaction terms showing the direct impact of the 
three reputation transfer enhancement mechanisms (number of previous flotation experiences by 
the VC firm invested in the focal IPO, the age diversity of firms backed by the same VC firm in 
the past, and the number of prior syndicated IPOs involving the VC firm as a lead investor) 
sequentially. They are then followed by Model (2e) which shows the model including the 
interaction term of our composite score, VC overall experience. All Models show a negative and 
significant coefficient of Lambda (p < 0.01), which indicates the existence of a selection bias of 
our VC-backed IPOs. In line with our expectations, Models (2b) to (2e) show that, after 
controlling for selection bias, the association between IPO premium and the Past VC Premium 
Trend is positively moderated by the three reputation transfer enhancers as well as by our 
composite score reflecting a VC’s overall experience (p < 0.001), consistent with Hypotheses 2, 
3, and 4. Our results in Models (2b) through (2e) indicate that an increase in the Past VC 
Premium Trend by one rank allows a VC firm to increase the premium of its current IPO by 
12%, and this is 1.1% (Experience diversity) to 5.2% (Lead Syndicate experience) higher in the 
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interaction with our VC reputation enhancers. More specifically, based on the average market 
capitalization of $393.21 million, the moderating role played by our VC reputation enhancers 
allows the market capitalization to be $4.33 million to $20.45 million higher. Again, these results 
provide support for the hypothesized positive moderating relationship of our three reputation 
transfer enhancers.  
Model (3a) -Panel B repeats our tests within the sub-sample using LPJ VC reputation 
index. It exhibits similar results to Model (2a) and shows a positive and significant association 
between IPO Premium and Past VC Premium Trend (p < 0.001). Further, Models (3b) to (3e) 
also show that our three reputation transfer enhancers as well as the overall VC experience 
positively moderate the positive association between IPO premium and the Past VC Premium 
Trend (at the p < 0.05 level or a more significant level). Interestingly, all models indicate a 
positive association between IPO premium and LPJ VC reputation (at the p < 0.10 or a more 
significant level). Overall, our results in Table 3 suggest that our Hypotheses 1 to 4 on the impact 
of Past VC Premium Trend hold even after controlling for the LPJ VC reputation index thus 
providing important evidence complementing prior research.   
To demonstrate the interaction effects, we plot in Figure 1 the impact of Past VC 
Premium Trend on predicted values of IPO Premium at different levels of VC Experience 
Intensity based on the entire sample of 7,331 individual VC firm-IPO firm observations. Using a 
one standard-deviation above or below the mean level, we show that the slope of the association 
between IPO Premium and Past VC Premium Trend is higher for VC firms with a high VC 
Experience Intensity than those with low VC Experience Intensity. Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate 
similar moderation effects for VC Experience Diversity and VC Syndication Experience, and VC 
Overall Experience, respectively. 
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- Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 About Here – 
Regarding control variables, Table 3 indicates that IPO Premium is positively related 
tothe size of VC firm syndicate (p < 0.001). IPO premium is also positively, yet less 
significantly, related to the IPO success ratio of the VC firm (at the p < 0.10 or a more significant 
level). In terms of firm characteristics, IPO Premium is higher in firms that are smaller (p < 
0.001), and older (p < 0.001). IPO premium is also higher in firm managed by more reputable 
underwriters (p < 0.001), and those going public during a hot period (p < 0.001).7  
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 To validate our results, we conduct a large number of robustness tests. First, our Past 
Premium Trend captures the overall, general trend, of price premium. However, our construct 
may be affected by the volatility of IPO prices, especially during the dot-com era. Table 4 
focuses on short-term premium trend, with a past premium trend calculated based on public 
offerings that occurred during the last year prior to IPO date. The results in Models (4a) to (4e) 
and (5a) to (5e) confirm our expectations and show a positive and significant association 
between IPO premium and Past Premium Trend over a one-year period (p < 0.001). Further, 
Models (4b) to (4e) show that IPO premium is also higher in the interaction terms between Past 
Premium Trend 1Y and our reputation transfer enhancers (at the p < 0.05 or a more significant 
level), and the results are slightly less significant in Models (5b) to (5e) (at the p < 0.10 or a more 
significant level). This suggests that temporal effects do not differentially affect the pricing 
outcomes. In other words, IPO stage investors care both about the short- and long-term pricing 
outcomes of a VC firm, and are not necessarily driven by an anchor-and-adjust behavior  in 
which IPO prices based on an assumed starting point and only adjusted from that point as new 
information comes available.  
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- Insert Table 4 About Here – 
The test of IPO pricing and its trend may suffer from bi-directionality concerns in which 
the past valuation trend may not necessarily be the only factor investors take into account as they 
may be also concerned about post-IPO performance of the firm. For example, a company that 
has a blockbuster IPO and then tanks in performance might damage VC reputation, while a 
company that has an “average” IPO and then performs better than expected may have a positive 
reputational effect on the VC. To control for the impact of post-IPO performance effect on 
reputation transfer, we tested the association between IPO premium with the VC’s past 
reputation trend using the one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return, BHAR 1Y, of the latest IPO 
the VC was involved in as a control.  The results in Table 5 show a positive and significant 
association between both IPO premium and the Latest BHAR1Y of the last IPO in which a VC 
firm was involved. More importantly, our results still validate our predictions on the role played 
by Past IPO premium trend and VC reputation transfer enhancers after controlling for the post-
IPO performance of previous listings of firms by the same VC. 
- Insert Table 5 About Here – 
Further, Table 6 examines the impact of the characteristics of VC firms on the association 
between IPO Premium and Past VC Premium Trend. In Panel A, we hand-collected data on VC 
ownership from the IPO prospectuses that we were able to access from Edgar and other online 
sources. In Panel B, we repeat our tests using a Last Round VC dummy, which is equal to 1 if the 
VC firm participates in the last round, zero otherwise. Finally, in Panel C, we repeat our tests 
including the Lead VC reputation as a control variable regardless whether the studied VC firm is 
the lead VC or not. Our empirical results indicate that IPO premium is positively related to our 
three VC characteristics: Largest VC Ownership dummy, Last Round VC dummy, and Log Lead 
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VC Age, which confirms the importance of the role played by VC firms. More importantly, we 
find strong evidence on the existence of a positive and significant association between IPO 
Premium and Past VC Premium Trend after controlling for VC firm characteristics. Our results 
also confirm the moderating effects of our reputation transfer enhancers on the positive 
association between IPO Premium and Past VC Premium Trend.  
- Insert Table 6 About Here – 
Our empirical tests use IPO firm age to calculate VC experience diversity. Previous 
studies suggest other risk factors that may help VC firms develop a diverse experience dealing 
with valuation uncertainties (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Therefore, in 
further robustness tests, we use the number of risk factors, and we argue that VC firms with a 
larger exposure to previous IPO deals with different levels of risk factors have a higher diversity 
experience in managing ex ante uncertainty. We therefore expect a positive association between 
VC risk-experience diversity and IPO premium. We hand-collected data for the number of risk 
factors as mentioned in the IPO prospectuses for 794 VC-backed IPOs. This resulted in a total 
number of 4,064 VC observations related to 962 VC firms using Log VC Age as a proxy for VC 
reputation. We then classified the number of risk factors in 10 different risk brackets of six risk 
factors each. Our 10 risk brackets include IPO firms with 1 to 6 risk factors, 7 to 12 risk 
factors…, 48 to 54 risk factors, and finally firms with 55 risk factors and above. We then counted 
the number of risk brackets in which a VC firm participated prior to the IPO date. As predicted, 
our empirical results show that IPO premium is positively related to Past VC Premium Trend, 
VC Risk Experience Diversity, and the interaction between both variables (at the p< 0.05 or a 
more significant level). This supports the use of VC diversity experience as a reputation transfer 
enhancer, and the results are available upon request.  
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Alternatively, the diversity of experience may depend on the exposure of VC firms to 
different industries, which provide them with greater abilities to identify potential opportunities 
and add value to portfolio companies (Hochberg et al., 2015; Yang, et al., 2009). We further 
calculated VC Industry Experience Diversity for our studied sample based on industry using two-
digit SIC codes. Looking at VC firms in our sample, a specific VC firm was involved in a 
maximum of 34 different two-digit SIC industry sub-groupings. In this context, we calculated the 
number of different industries in which a VC firm had a prior experience prior to IPO date. The 
results remain consistent and show that IPO premium is positively associated with Past Premium 
Trend, VC Industry Experience Diversity, and the interaction term between both variables (at the 
p< 0.01 or a more significant level).  
Further, as an alternative model specification at the level of the focal IPO firm, investors 
may look at the average reputation transfer provided by all VC firms in the syndicate rather than 
the one provided by the lead VC firm. To address this possibility, we calculate the average past 
premium trend of all VC firms within the syndicate, and examine the effect of VC firm 
reputation transfer at the level of the focal IPO firm. Our empirical tests confirm our predictions 
and show that the current IPO premium is positively related to the average past premium trend of 
all VC firms in the VC firm’s syndicate (p < 0.001). The current IPO premium is also positively 
related to the interaction of the average past premium with both cumulative experience intensity 
and experience diversity of the VC firm syndicate (p < 0.001). Overall, our results indicate the 
individual VC firm effect is significant even after controlling for the effect of other VC members 
within the VC syndicate. Also, the results show reputation transfer impacts IPO value regardless 
of whether the empirical tests are conducted at IPO firm level, or at the level of specific VC 
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firms. Our findings also indicate the effects at the VC firm level are stronger than the effects at 
the overall VC firm syndicate level.8  
DISCUSSION 
We hypothesize and show that IPO firm valuation depends on how reputation of its VC 
investors builds over time – VC firms’ prior successes and failures affect their ability to impact 
the price premium in subsequent IPOs. Thus, the VC firms’ ability to affect positively the 
valuation of the focal IPO they are associated with will increase depending on their prior success.   
The theory developed here advances understanding of reputation transfer in significant new ways 
by highlighting that the process of valuation of IPO firms through the association with VC firms 
should be analyzed in the context of prior VC firms’ involvement in the IPO market that changes 
over time.  The cumulative success of VC firms in the IPO market can lead to positive impacts 
for IPO firms that utilize them after that success, while VC firms with unsuccessful track records 
can see their impact on investor perceptions of the focal IPO’s value decline. Our testable 
hypotheses remain valid after controlling for the impact of VC reputation using commonly used 
proxies such as VC age and LPJ VC reputation index. Our results specifically indicate that an 
increase in the Past VC Premium Trend by one rank leads to an increase of the focal IPO’s 
market capitalization by $46.48 million on average, which represents a significant economic 
effect associated with the VC firm’s reputation build-up over time.  
Additionally, we extend theoretical understanding of organizational outcomes of 
reputation by examining three time-dependent reputation transfer enhancers associated with a 
focal firm; a conceptualization of reputation transfer not investigated until now.  Our evidence is 
that these enhancers can moderate the overall effect of direct reputation transfer within the VC 
firm-IPO pair. Moreover, it is the reputation of an individual VC firm that seems to matter more 
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since the effects at the individual VC firm level are stronger than at the syndicate level. The 
future use of this understanding by researchers on VC firms and other entities with reputational 
capital will allow a far more comprehensive exploration of organizational effects of reputation to 
be developed.   
By examining IPOs and the role of VC firms, our research has also allowed a significant 
expansion of the understanding of the sociological approach to financial market behavior, a 
concept growing in importance in the literature (Bell et al., 2014; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  
While scholars recognize VC firms as entities increasing the value of the focal IPO through their 
association, our research provides key insights into how VC firms accomplish this, and into the 
different mechanisms of reputation transfer.  Thus, we also contribute to the specific literature 
relating to the role of VC firms in the IPO firm by bringing the consideration of time dimensions 
into complex processes associated with VC investors in firms undergoing an IPO.   
 The overall theoretical implication of the finding of the possible impacts of 
increasing/decreasing reputation on value perceptions is that researchers must be far more 
detailed in their analysis of reputation transfer processes by moving away from a unidirectional 
perspective (Lange et al., 2011). Indeed, prior empirical studies have computed reputation on an 
annual market share basis since it is very difficult to approximate this essentially unobservable 
social construct (Krishnan et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2011).  However, as demonstrated here, 
scholars need to consider not only how a transfer of prior reputation of VCs affects valuations of 
their IPOs but also how IPO success feeds back or spills over into a further build-up of VC 
reputation in subsequent periods. Researchers have to rise to the challenge to develop this more 
dynamic and complex understanding of reputation as we seek to further understanding in the 
field. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Our evidence indicates entrepreneurial firms can employ specific mechanisms to increase 
the view of the market of their value at IPO.  The ability to associate the entrepreneurial venture 
with others can allow entrepreneurs to offer cognitive shortcuts by public market investors who 
make value judgments in the highly uncertain context. Marketing research has long emphasized 
such issues in relation to customers in established firms (Yang, Su, and Fam, 2012).  
Our findings also have implications for IPO investors. Compared to other VC reputation 
measures, our analysis reflects the track record of a specific VC firm in terms of IPO valuations. 
This means that a less reputable VC firm – in terms of size, age, amount or number of managed 
funds, etc. –  might have a positive trend if it is constantly improving its IPO valuation record 
over time. In contrast, a more reputable VC firm – in terms of size, age, amount or number of 
managed funds, etc. –  might have a negative trend if its IPO valuation record is variable and 
decreasing over time. As VC firms compete to attract IPO investors (or limited partners in their 
future funds), our trend analysis suggests that traditional reputation measures are not sufficient 
for investors. Rather, while reputation creates a bond, loyalty and respect, a consistently 
successful track record of IPO valuation is key for IPO investors. This insight also has 
implications for limited partner investors in VC funds since it will impact fund returns.      
This research also helps provide guidance to entrepreneurs suggesting that part of their 
strategic actions should include activities involving the transfer of reputation of third parties that 
can help build the legitimacy of their firm in the eyes of those outside it. Likewise, entrepreneurs 
may experience a significant loss of value if they associate their companies with VC firms who 
lost their reputation or have a declining reputation trend. Similarly, VC firms should be able to 
make greater use during negotiations of the importance of their contribution to the value building 
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in the entrepreneur’s firm as the VC firms experience greater success over time. Our findings 
may also have implications for the ability of more experienced VC firms to attract better 
syndicate partners who perceive the value they can add to IPO firms.   
Our empirical context is related to IPO firms, but our arguments can be applied to their 
more mature and established peers.  For example, reputation damage to Toyota is argued to have 
affected its affiliated companies and other Japanese car manufacturers since the dynamic nature 
of reputation suggests that when negative events affect an organization, affiliates are held to be 
“guilty by association” (Lange et al., 2011). 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The pressure to demonstrate compliance with the expected norms and values is critical 
for entrepreneurial firms due to their liability of newness.  As a result, entrepreneurial firms 
actively seek to associate with other powerful players to help validate that they meet expected 
norms and behaviors.  Theoretically, we have framed our research in terms of reputation for the 
firm. However, the finding that the biggest “reputation transfer enhancer” is the number of 
previous IPOs a VC has participated in suggests an element of learning-by-doing and learning-
by-experience that has the potential to enhance organizational learning theory. Scholars in the 
future should also expand the potential for greater theoretical understanding from this work for 
organizational learning. This also speaks to the concept of path dependency associated with the 
luck of the earliest investment decisions (Gompers et al., 2010). However, our findings that 
reputation can change due to poor performance also opens up opportunities to add to work on 
shifting path dependencies (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Rasmussen et al., 2011).  
A future research topic will be to examine if such increasing, or decreasing, reputation is 
also found among other entities the focal IPO firm may be associated with as it seeks to build its 
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value.  Specifically, scholars should also explore the role of investment banks managing the IPO 
process.  Greater investigation should compare VC firms’ and investment banks’ ability to help 
build value for the focal IPO firm since such factors may be complementary.   
Improving perceptions of external audiences is not only a concern to IPOs.  Thus, there is 
also a need for future research concerning reputation transfers and their enhancers, particularly in 
a rich set of contexts in which reputation plays a role such as joint ventures (Dacin, et al., 2007), 
top management teams (Cohen and Dean, 2005), or boards of directors (Marcel and Cowen, 
2014).   It would also be valuable to expand the examination beyond VC firms to other key 
parties that can help the firm build its value such as private individual investors (business 
angels), strategic alliance partners, and accounting firms.   
The nature of the relationship between the reputation transfer enhancers also raises an 
important theoretical question: Can an IPO firm compensate for its lack of financial performance 
prior to the IPO by engaging with a highly “visible” VC firm with significant prior experience to 
achieve a high valuation level? In line with Bell et al. (2014), future research should investigate 
the overall impact of “configurations” of reputation transfer to offset negative aspects of the 
firm’s valuation by the investor community as the firm goes to IPO. Such configurations might 
also include the contribution of the quality or expertise of the general partners of the VC firm. 
Further, using price premium trend as a proxy for IPO value that is impacted by 
reputation transfer is a possible limitation of the study. More importantly, many VC firm-backed 
entrepreneurial firms exit through strategic sale to a corporate partner. Additional research 
should explore whether similar findings hold regarding the role of VC firm experience in 
perceptions of entrepreneurial firms acquired by corporations, as well as the role of investment 
banks in this process. Additionally, our paper focuses on reputation among VC firms. In contrast, 
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there are calls for developing a more micro-perspective on reputation among VC peers. As most 
VC investments are syndicated, we already have multiple players that we need to account for in 
our empirical analyses. Adding a micro-perspective by focusing on individual reputation among 
peers would add a burdensome level of complexity in a comprehensive empirical paper based on 
firms. However, consideration of the importance of a micro-perspective on reputation may be 
another important area for future research. 
Finally, we acknowledge that there may be logical inter-dependencies between the main 
effects of contingency factors that we used in our model. As with any contingency framework, 
this is a possibility that one cannot discard, and future research will help to establish further that 
our results are valid in other settings and when employing other analysis mechanisms. 
CONCLUSION 
Reputation is a core concept in organizational theory and strategic management.  While 
the concept is central to much of the research in management, elaboration of the theory around 
the concept has surprisingly been limited. Our research fills this gap by theoretically developing 
the rationale and showing empirical support for the argument that reputation can change over 
time, therefore making the effectiveness of reputational transfer to the associated entities’ value 
perceptions time-dependent.  Our research also shows there are different mechanisms through 
which reputation of a third party can be transferred to build value of the focal firm.  Our hope is 
that others not only employ this new expanded understanding of reputation but use it as a 
foundation for the expansion of knowledge on this important topic. 
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ENDNOTES 
1   Press comment also points to this bi-directional change in reputations over time: “…The 
market changes have left Kleiner…..with dozens of investments that may never pay off, 
threatening its image as the gold standard of venture capital….Some Silicon Valley 
entrepreneurs say Kleiner, while well-regarded, is no longer at the very top of the VC heap. Such 
impressions matter when VC firms compete to fund the most promising startups, and getting in 
on the best deals is in turn key to future success” (McBride & Groom, 2013). Further, Atanasov, 
Ivanov and Litvak (2012) also find support for the argument that VCs may experience a 
reduction in reputation in their investigation of the impact of litigation on VCs.    
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this helpful suggestion.  
3 Welbourne and Andrews (1996) use the following example to justify the construction of the 
IPO premium. Consider two companies selling their stock at $10.00 per share. Firm X has a 
book value of $2.00, and firm Y has a book value of $6.00. Firm X is a riskier investment, 
because if it goes bankrupt, its assets are only worth $2.00, but those of firm Y are worth $6.00. 
For firm X and firm Y to command equivalent stock prices, an investor must believe that firm X 
has the potential to do very well. The difference between the stock price and the book value per 
share is called the dilution value, since it represents a dilution to investors purchasing the stock. 
However, from the company's perspective, it is a price premium. The company attempts to 
maximize this premium in its offering, and investors wish to minimize the premium so that their 
investments are more secure. Further, Welbourne and Andrews (1996) and other researchers 
clearly recognize limitations of using the book value in the denominator for IPO firms. This is 
especially the case in young IPOs with limited history and low book value, which may 
artificially inflate their IPO price premium. Using the offer price as a denominator allows us to 
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avoid such limitations and provides a more reliable proxy of the percentage of the price paid in 
excess of the book value per share. 
4 In line with Loughran and Ritter (2004), hi-tech firms as those with the following SIC codes: 
3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications 
equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation 
equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 3845 
(medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications services), 
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). 
5 We thank the reviewers for this helpful suggestion.  
6 In further robustness tests, we repeat our tests using fixed effects panel regressions and 
controlling for the inverse mills. The Hausman test shows a significant p-value at the 1% level, 
which suggests that fixed effects can be used to control for potential endogeneity. Our empirical 
tests show consistent results and validate our predictions on the association between IPO 
valuation and VC reputation trend. The results are available upon request. 
7 Our IPO premium measures the excess price paid over and above the book value, and we do not 
take into account a price discovery process which leads to a negotiated price depending on the 
characteristics of the issuing firms, investment banks, and IPO investors (Loughran and Ritter, 
2004). We therefore run an additional robustness test using Tobin’s Q, calculated at the closing 
price of the first day of trading, as a dependent variable. Similar to the price premium trend, we 
calculated a new ordinal variable for Tobin’s Q, Past VC Tobin’s Q Trend, ranging from 1 to 5 
since 1990 for each VC firm. Our results confirm the positive and significant relationship 
between the Tobin’s Q variable and the Past VC Tobin’s Q Trend as well as the positive 
moderating effect of our three reputation transfer enhancers. Our results are robust with the 
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entire sample using VC Age or the sub-sample using LPJ VC reputation index. Considering 
Tobin’s Q, we may avoid looking deeply into the price negotiation between issuers and 
underwriters and directly focus on public market investor valuations. Our findings confirm that 
our dynamic VC reputation measure still positively affects IPO pricing dynamics, and the results 
are available upon request. 
8 Although not tabulated, in further investigations we repeated all our empirical tests using LPJ 
VC reputation index as a control variable for VC reputation. The results remain consistent, yet 
slightly less significant, and confirm our hypotheses. We further examined the role of 
underwriter reputation in affecting the association between IPO valuation and our measure for 
VC reputation. Specifically, using IPO premium as a dependent variable, we controlled for the 
interaction of underwriter reputation with Past VC premium trend. Our tests indicate the lack of a 
significant effect of Underwriter Reputation x Past VC premium trend on IPO premium.  This 
suggests that underwriter reputation positively affect IPO premium. However, it does not affect 
the association between Past IPO Premium trend and IPO premium.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
           Mean      s.d.             1             2 3             4           5            6  7 8 9 10           11          12           13   
1.   IPO Premium 0.73 0.34  1.00             
2.   Past VC Premium Trend 3.31 1.22   .34***  1.00            
3.   VC Experience Intensity 16.43 19.33   .06***  -.09***  1.00           
4.   VC Experience Diversity 2.42 1.39   .06***  -.03**   .65***  1.00          
5.   VC Lead Synd. Experience 0.16 0.22   .01*  -.02**   .21***   .35***  1.00         
6.   VC Overall Experience 3.16 1.18   .04***  -.05***   .69***   .79***   .56***  1.00        
7.   Price Revision 0.05 0.27   .02**   .00   .04***  -.01   .01   .02**  1.00       
8.   Lead VC dummy 0.19 0.39  -.02**   .01*   .06***   .13***   .19***   .14***  -.02**  1.00      
9.   VC Age 16.59 13.35   .03**   .00   .34***   .33***   .14***   .34***   .01   .05***  1.00     
10. LPJ VC Reputation 24.36 21.14   .02**   .01*   .69***   .54***   .20***   .54***   .05***   .05***   .36***  1.00    
11. VC IPO Success rate 0.11 0.09    .01*   .04***  -.08***  -.02**  -.01  -.05***  -.07***   .00  -.06***  -.05***  1.00   
12. Independent VC 0.67 0.47  -.01   .00   .12***   .05***   .12***   .12***   .01   .09***  -.06***   .27***  -.03**  1.00  
13. Financial VC 0.18 0.38  -.02**   .01   .02**   .12***   .00   .04***  -.03**  -.02**   .15***  -.18***   .05***  -.67***  1.00 
14. Corporate VC 0.09 0.29   .04***  -.03**  -.14***  -.19***  -.15  -.20***   .06***  -.09***  -.11***  -.17***  -.03**  -.46***  -.15*** 
15. VC Syndicate 8.87 5.08   .09***  -.01  -.05***  -.11***  -.15***  -.09***   .00  -.33***  -.03**   .00  -.02**  -.05***  -.02** 
16. Total Assets 152.29 751.12  -.06***  -.04***   .01   .09***   .05***   .03**  -.04***   .04***   .05***  -.03   .05  -.02   .05*** 
17. IPO Age 9.45 12.38  -.00  -.02*  -.01   .14***   .09***   .05***  -.08***   .10***   .07***  -.05***   .07***  -.04***   .09*** 
18. Hi-tech dummy 0.41 0.49   .01   .03**   .05***  -.01   .00   .02   .32***  -.01   .02   .02  -.08***   .00  -.04*** 
19. Loss dummy 0.63 0.48   .08***   .00  -.01  -.08***  -.04***  -.04***  -.03**  -.06***  -.05***  -.01  -.04***  -.01  -.03** 
20. Debt to Equity 0.29 0.30  -.00   .04***   .00   .03**   .05***   .03**   .02**   .04***   .02   .01  -.02   .00   .02 
21. Participation ratio 0.07 0.15  -.02**   .06***   .00   .07***   .04***   .03**   .01   .07***   .06***  -.01   .07***   .01   .02 
22. Underwriter Reputation 8.26 1.34   .05***  -.02   .07***   .03**  -.02   .03**   .15***  -.05***   .02   .06***  -.07***  -.01  -.03** 
23. NASDAQ 0.82 0.39  -.01   .00  -.01  -.02   .00  -.01   .06***   .00  -.03**  -.01  -.01   .03**  -.03** 
24. Market Return 0.02 0.06  -.07***  -.04***   .00   .00   .02   .02   .19***  -.01  -.01  -.01  -.02   .01  -.01 
25. Heat degree 0.48 0.23   .09***   .03***   .01*  -.02**   .00   .00   .46***  -.02**  -.02**   .00  -.04***   .01  -.03** 
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     14   15  16  17  18   19    20    21    22    23 24 25  
12. Corporate VC    1.00            
13. VC Syndicate     .07***  1.00           
14. Total Assets    -.02  -.10***  1.00          
15. IPO Age    -.06***  -.10***   0.15*** 1.00         
16. Hi-tech dummy     .07***   .01  -.07***  -.08***  1.00        
17. Loss dummy     .07***   .09***  -.03**  -.13***   .07***  1.00       
18. Debt to Equity    -.02  -.05***   .03**   .08***   .02  -.06  1.00      
19. Participation ratio    -.07***  -.05***   .12***   .18***   .14***  -.20***   .03**  1.00     
20. Underwriter Reputation     .05***   .11***   .06***  -.02   .08***   .03**   .01  -.01  1.00    
21. NASDAQ    -.01  -.02  -.07***  -.03**  -.02   .06***  -.15***  -.05***   .01  1.00   
22. Market Return     .02  -.03**  -.04***  -.05***   .06***  -.02  -.02  -.06***   .03**   .04***  1.00  
23. Heat degree     .05***   .00  -.04***  -.08***   .11***   .02  -.02  -.09***   .11***   .08***   .36*** 1.00    
 
Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics in mean and standard deviation for the total number of 7,331 individual VC observations for 1,174 VCs involved in 1,676 VC-backed 
IPOs from 1990 to 2011, and the Correlation Matrix for the main variables. Pearson’s correlation coefficients were used for continuous variables, point biserial correlation 
coefficients were used for dichotomous variables. *     p < .05, **   p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 2 
The Likelihood of Going Public for VC-backed Portfolio Companies 
              Logit (IPO= 1) 
          (1)   
 Constant -10.07*** 
  1.07  
 Log Book Value of Portfolio Company Equity 1.41*** 
  0.04  
 Log Portfolio Company Age at Last Round 0.54*** 
  0.08  
 Log Average VC Syndicate Age 0.05*  
  0.03  
 Seed Stage dummy -3.68*** 
  0.12  
 Early Stage dummy -3.63*** 
  0.09  
 Expansion Stage dummy -3.33*** 
  0.08  
 Late Stage dummy 2.60*** 
  0.09  
 Log Number of Previous IPOs 0.23† 
  0.14  
 Market Return 0.30** 
  0.11  
 Heat degree 0.17† 
  0.09   
 GDP per Capita Growth -0.01  
  0.01  
 State Effects Yes  
 Industry Effects Yes  
 Year Effects Yes  
 N. 26172  
 Pseudo R2 0.38  
 LR chi2 7636.57  
 Prob. 0.00  
  
Table 2 includes the logit regression run for the Probability of going public using all the list of VC-backed portfolio companies from 
1987 to 2011. The dependent variable is Prob. of Going Public is a dummy variable equal to one if the VC-backed portfolio company 
goes public during the studied period, zero otherwise. Standard errors are in Italics. † p< 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table 3 
IPO Premium, Past VC Premium Trend, and the moderating effects of Reputation Transfer Enhancers at the VC firm level 
 
                IPO Premium      
 Panel A – Using Log VC Age as a proxy for VC reputation Panel B – Using LPJ VC Reputation as a proxy for VC reputation 
         (2a)              (2b)   (2c)  (2d) (2e)  (3a)               (3b)   (3c)  (3d)   (3e)   
Constant 0.43 0.72* 0.67* 0.64* 0.42 0.42† 0.47† 0.57* 0.59* 0.48†  
 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25  
Past Premium Trend 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
VC Experience Intensity  0.07*     0.08***       
  0.03     0.02       
Past Premium Trend x VC Experience Intensity 0.03***     0.04***     
  0.01     0.01     
VC Experience Diversity   0.02***     0.01†    
   0.01     0.01     
Past Premium Trend x VC Experience Diversity  0.01***     0.01**     
   0.00     0.00      
VC Syndication Experience     0.03     -0.02    
    0.03     0.04    
Past Premium Trend x VC Syndication Experience    0.05***     0.05*   
    0.02     0.02    
VC Overall Experience     0.03***     0.02* 
     0.01     0.01  
Past Premium Trend x VC Overall Experience    0.01***     0.01** 
     0.00     0.00  
Price Revision 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02† 0.02† 0.02† 0.02† 0.02† 
 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Lead VC dummy 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Log VC Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02      
 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04       
LPJ VC Reputation      0.00** 0.00† 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 
      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
VC IPO Success Ratio 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.14** 0.11† 0.11† 0.11† 0.11† 0.11† 
 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07  
Independent VC dummy -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07  
 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16  
Financial VC dummy -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.31  
 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27  
Corporate VC dummy 0.48† 0.48† 0.49† 0.49† 0.49† 0.76* 0.80* 0.78* 0.77* 0.81* 
 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35  
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VC Syndicate 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Log Total Assets -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.09 *** 
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Log IPO Age 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
Hi-tech dummy -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Leverage  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
Loss dummy 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Participation ratio -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  
 0.03 0.03 0.027 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04  
Underwriter Reputation 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
NASDAQ dummy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Market Return -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08  
 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09  
Heat degree 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.026 0.03 0.03 0.03  
Lambda -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
VC Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
IPO Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
IPO Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N.  7331 7331 7331 7331 7331 3737 3737 3737 3737 3737  
Adj. R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32  
F-Statistics 3.86 3.88 3.91 3.87 3.91 4.15 4.16 4.14 4.14 4.17  
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Table 3 includes the OLS regressions for IPO Premium of VCs involved within the studied sample. This includes a total number of 7,331 (3,737) individual VC observations for 
1,174 (522) VCs involved in 1,676 IPOs from 1990 to 2011 using Log VC Age (LPJ VC Reputation Index) as a proxy for VC reputation. The dependent variable is IPO Premium, 
i.e. the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the book value per share over the offer price. Standard errors are in Italics. † p< 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table 4 
IPO Premium, One-Year Past VC Premium Trend, and the moderating effects of Reputation Transfer Enhancers at the VC 
firm level  
 
       IPO Premium      
Reputation Transfer Enhancers:     Intensity     Diversity   Lead Synd.   Overall  
        (4a)             (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e)   
Constant 0.65† 0.63† 0.69* 0.71* 0.72*   
 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Past Premium Trend 1Y 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
VC Reputation Transfer Enhancers  0.05* 0.03*** 0.05 0.02**   
  0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01  
Past Premium Trend 1Y x VC Reputation Transfer Enhancers 0.01* 0.00* 0.05*** 0.01*   
  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Log VC Age 0.02 0.01 0.017 0.02 -0.01   
 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06   
Lambda -0.02** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02**  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
VC Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
IPO Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
IPO Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
N.  4488 4488 4488 4488 4488  
Adj. R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 
F-Statistics 2.58 2.60 2.64 2.63 2.62 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Table 4 includes the OLS regressions for IPO Premium of VCs involved within the studied sample. Past VC Premium Trend 1Y is the 
trend of the price premium for all previous IPOs in which the same VC firm participated during the last year prior to the focal IPO’s 
date. This includes a total number of 4,488 individual VC observations for 790 VCs from 1990 to 2011. The dependent variable is IPO 
Premium, i.e. the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the book value per share over the offer price. Standard errors are in 
Italics. † p< 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table 5 
IPO Premium, Past VC Premium Trend, and the moderating effects of Reputation Transfer Enhancers at the VC firm level  
 
       IPO Premium      
Reputation Transfer Enhancers:     Intensity     Diversity   Lead Synd.   Overall  
        (5a)           (5b) (5c) (5d) (5e)   
Constant 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.43 0.61 
 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 
Past Premium Trend 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12***  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
VC Reputation Transfer Enhancers  0.05 0.02** -0.03 0.02†  
  0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Past Premium Trend x VC Reputation Transfer Enhancers 0.01† 0.01*** 0.06* 0.01**  
  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Latest BHAR1Y 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Log VC Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01    
 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07    
Lambda -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
VC Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
IPO Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
IPO Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
N.  3564 3564 3564 3564 3564  
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
F-Statistics 2.81 2.81 2.85 2.82 2.83 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Table 5 includes the OLS regressions for IPO Premium of VCs involved within the studied sample. Past VC Premium is the trend of the 
price premium for all previous IPOs in which the same VC firm participated during the last year prior to the focal IPO’s date. This 
includes a total number of 3,564 individual VC observations for 946 VCs from 1990 to 2011. The dependent variable is IPO Premium, 
i.e. the ratio of the difference between the offer price and the book value per share over the offer price. Standard errors are in Italics. † 
p< 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Table 6 
IPO Premium, Past VC Premium Trend, and the moderating effects of Reputation Transfer Enhancers at the VC firm level: Controlling for further VC firm 
characteristics  
 
       Panel A – Including the Largest             Panel B – Including Last               Panel C – Including Lead  
                                                       VC (Ownership) dummy                                  Round VC dummy                  VC Reputation (Lead VC Age)  
Dependent Variable: IPO Premium      
Reputation Transfer Enhancers:   Intensity   Diversity Lead Synd.  Overall Intensity   Diversity Lead Synd.  Overall Intensity   Diversity Lead Synd.  Overall  
        (6a) (6b)   (6c) (6d) (7a) (7b)   (7c) (7d) (8a) (8b)   (8c) (8d)  
Constant 0.70 0.62 0.66 0.61 0.71* 0.66* 0.63* 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.34 
 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Past Premium Trend 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VC Reputation Transfer Enhancers 0.07 0.05*** -0.03 0.04** 0.07* 0.02*** 0.03 0.03*** 0.07* 0.02*** 0.03 0.03*** 
 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Past Premium Trend 0.01† 0.01† 0.06* 0.01† 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.01*** 
    x VC Rep. Transf. Enhancers 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Largest VC ownership dummy 0.03* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 
 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  
Last Round VC dummy     0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
     0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
Log Lead VC Age         0.01† 0.01† 0.01† 0.01†  
         0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Non Lead Log VC Age         -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02   
         0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04  
Log VC Age 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02       
 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04       
Lambda -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
VC Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IPO Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IPO Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
N. 3752 3752 3752 3752 7331 7331 7331 7331 7331 7331 7331 7331 
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 
F-Statistics 2.97 3.02 2.97 2.99 3.88 3.91 3.87 3.91 3.88 3.91 3.87 3.91 
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Table 6 includes the OLS regressions for IPO Premium of VCs involved within the studied sample. The dependent variable is IPO Premium, i.e. the ratio of the difference between 
the offer price and the book value per share over the offer price. Standard errors are in Italics. † p< 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Figure 1           Figure 2 
     VC Experience Intensity and the association between        VC Experience Diversity and the association between  
           IPO Premium and Past VC Premiun Trend      IPO Premium and Past VC Premiun Trend 
        
Figure 3           Figure 4 
     VC Lead Syndicate Experience and the association        VC Overall Experience and the association between  
     between IPO Premium and Past VC Premiun Trend      IPO Premium and Past VC Premiun Trend 
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